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ABSTRACT
Securities law in the United States has a unique approach to defining what is a
security and what is not a security. It includes broadly defined terminology and
describes several investment instruments that may be considered a security.
Courts use one of two methods to determine whether an investment contract is a
security: the Howey Test and the Risk Capital Test.
Initial Coin Offerings are one of the most recent instruments that courts and other
governmental organizations need to examine in order to answer whether they
meet the criteria of being a security. Depending on the result, the issuers may
need to take certain actions, or they will have to bear the consequences. The
Securities and Exchange Commission and the courts have been trying to interpret
existing securities law in terms of this new instrument. However, courts,
governmental institutions, companies, and individuals do not have specific
answers as to whether or not these offerings are securities.
Since many Initial Coin Offerings remain within the area of securities law, there
are solutions for issuers who want to avoid severe consequences. First, the Initial
Coin Offeror can choose to apply for exemptions from registration. The issuer
can also structure the token in such a way that courts and governmental
institutions could not consider the token to be a security.
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INTRODUCTION
I began this research because of my interest in crypto-currencies and a specific means by
which entrepreneurs have begun to use them to raise funds for crypto-based project development.
While I was in the LL.M. program at Indiana University Maurer School of Law, a surge of new
offerings in crypto-currencies allowed entrepreneurs to raise significant sums of equity or capital
with which to build their businesses. The manner of these offerings became known as “Initial
Coin Offerings” (ICOs) because the entrepreneurs offered to sell “tokens” representing one coin
to members of the public. Though they were able to find investors willing to buy these tokens,
the issuers of these tokens tripped over federal and state securities laws in the United States and
attracted the attention of federal and state regulators and law enforcement agencies. In some
cases, the issuers were sued by their customers for selling what the customers have argued—and
regulators have acknowledged—may be securities under federal or state law definitions of the
term “securities,” which violates laws designed to protect the investing public.
Although most of the funds raised by sales under these ICOs were collected from
investors in the United States, investors in other nations were also investing in ICOs. This
prompted me to want to explore whether, and to what extent, U.S. federal or state securities laws
apply to ICOs. This led me to the central questions in this thesis:
1.) Are all ICOs governed by U.S. federal or state securities laws?
2.) If not, then how do crypto-entrepreneurs know when they must comply with federal
or state securities laws before they become the subjects of federal or state
investigations or defendants in lawsuits brought by their customers?
3.) Do regulations promulgated by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
help some ICO issuers by exempting them from full “registration” of their offerings
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with the SEC and from the obligations on issuers of “securities” to disclose key facts
about their businesses when they offer to sell equity to the public?
In addition to these important questions about U.S. laws, my research interests extend to
the manner in which ICOs might be viewed by other governments around the world. This thesis,
however, focuses on the key aspects of U.S. securities laws and exemptions from their effect that
have been developed over more than 75 years, the manner in which courts in the U.S. have
viewed the key term “securities” in this regulatory scheme in the past, and how ICOs might
benefit or suffer from that regulatory and case law history. This thesis does not discuss non-U.S.
securities laws, in part because I hope to make that the subject of future research.
In Chapter 1 of this thesis, I evaluate the longest-standing judicial interpretation of the
term “securities” under the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act) and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act) announced by the United States Supreme Court in Securities and
Exchange Commission v. W. J. Howey Co. in 1946:1
The term “security” means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future,
security-based swap, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of
interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract,
voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided
interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or
privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities
(including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call,
straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange
relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly
known as a “security”, or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary
or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe
to or purchase, any of the foregoing. 2
The Court – relying on the definition in 15 USCS § 77b – held that

1
2

SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
15 U.S.C.S. § 77b (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-281, approved 12/1/18).
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the term “security” covered any offering to the general public that met the
following criteria: an investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act
means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a
common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the
promoter or a third party, it being immaterial whether the shares in the enterprise
are evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal interests in the physical assets
employed in the enterprise.3
I also examine which courts are interpreting state “blue sky” laws and have held that tokens are
“securities” under those laws.
In Chapter 2, I examine the facts in several ICOs since 2016 that have attracted attention
either from regulators as law enforcement agencies or from investors. I also explain how, in my
opinion, these ICOs do or do not qualify as “securities” under the definitions in the 1933 Act and
1934 Act.
In Chapter 3, I analyze four different tokens in terms of the positions taken by the SEC,
state law enforcement agencies, and the courts. I think that these tokens are essential in the
formation of token securities law.
In Chapter 4, I set forth the only means for escaping the registration-and-disclosure
requirements of the 1933 Act and 1934 Act, which is to offer a token that does not qualify as a
“security” under the Acts as interpreted in Howey or to offer tokens in a manner that qualifies for
several statutory and regulatory “exemptions” to those Acts.
In the Conclusion, I offer preliminary advice to entrepreneurs who plan to offer their
tokens in the United States, but do not want to be subject to the requirements of the 1933 Act, the
1934 Act, or state “blue sky” laws. In this set of conclusions, I urge attention to the exemptions
to registration that are available to issuers who offer tokens in the United States.

3

Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99.
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CHAPTER 1: INVESTMENT CONTRACTS
1.1 Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934
To be covered under the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act) or the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act), the offering and resulting assets must be deemed to be “securities.”
The definition of the term “security” is intentionally broad, and courts in the United States have
been interpreting the term liberally for more than 80 years.
Does it matter whether an offering qualifies as a “security” or not? The answer is yes.
The presence of a security in a transaction leads to some regulatory consequences under the 1934
Act. For this reason, it is essential to look at the factors that the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and U.S. courts use when determining whether the offering falls under the
definitions provided in the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
This section will first explain the differences between the definitions of a “security” in
the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act. Next, it will focus on the definition of the term “investment
contract,” a term used in both Acts, and the manner in which the SEC and U.S. courts have
interpreted that term in order to bring offerings that do not otherwise fit within the parameters of
other terms under the definitions of “security” in the Acts. The “investment contract” definition
and judicial gloss added since the 1930’s are particularly helpful to determine when “initial coin
offerings (ICOs)” qualify as “securities” governed by the 1933 and 1934 Acts, which is the core
work of this thesis.
1.2 Definition of Security
The Securities Act of 1933 defines the term “security” as follows:

4

When used in this title, unless the context otherwise requires— The term
‘‘security’’ means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, security-based
swap, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or
participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment
contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option,
or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities
(including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call,
straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange
relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly
known as a ‘‘security’’, or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary
or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe
to or purchase, any of the foregoing. 4
The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 similarly defines the term “security” as:
any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, security-based swap, bond,
debenture, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement
or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment
contract, voting trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, any put, call,
straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or
index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof),
or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities
exchange relating to foreign currency, or in general, any instrument commonly
known as a ‘‘security’’; or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary
or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft,
bill of exchange, or banker’s acceptance which has a maturity at the time of
issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal
thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.5
The definition of security in the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act is almost the same. 6 However,
the last part of the definition in the 1934 Act, starting with “but shall not include any note,” is
regulated under section 3 in the 1933 Act.7 Therefore, while the 1933 Act exempts the short-term

4

15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(a)(1) (emphasis added).
15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(10) (emphasis added).
6
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
7
See Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) et
seq.); Securities Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) et
seq.).
5

5

notes from being a security, the 1934 Act excludes the short-term notes from the definition. 8
Congress wanted to exclude short-term notes from the securities definition. Otherwise, even a
personal loan could qualify as a security and would need an exemption from registration. 9
There are two types of instruments that are considered a security. Note, stock, and bond,
are considered a specific type of security instrument. 10 Then, there is “a laundry list of securities”
in the Acts, such as “evidence of indebtedness,” “participation in any profit-sharing agreement,”
“investment contract,” and “any instrument commonly known as a security.” 11 However, the
phrase “unless the context otherwise requires” can change the scope of these Acts. Therefore,
even though the instrument that appears to fall into any of the statutory definitions, the
instrument may not be held to be a security if the context otherwise requires. 12
Due to the broad statutory definition of the term “security,” there is a vast range of
uncommon investments that fall to the world of U.S. securities laws. 13 Subsequently, the
statutory language is extensive, and courts are struggling to provide predictable guidelines. 14
Congress intended to cover several financial instruments, such as stocks and bonds, as well as
other more hidden arrangements.15 Offerings involving Scotch whiskey, 16 cosmetics,17 beavers,18

8

THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 56 (2006).
Id.
10
JOHN C. COFFEE, JOEL SELIGMAN & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 254
(10th ed. 2007).
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION 30 (2016).
14
Id.
15
SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 2001).
16
SEC v. Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1386, 1389 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). (Scotch whiskey warehouse
receipts were considered a security. Customers were promised to get profit from the investment.)
17
SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 1974). (Pyramid promotion enterprise of
cosmetics were considered a security.).
18
Cont'l Mktg. Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466, 470 (10th Cir. 1967). (Live beaver brokerage business was considered a
security. The issuer promised “geometric profits” when the live beaver reproduced.)
9
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muskrats,19 animal breeding programs,20 fishing boats,21 coin-operated telephones,22 and orange
groves,23 have all been considered a security by both the SEC and the courts. 24
Investment contracts are the device that courts use to find out whether the underlying
agreement is a security. In order to determine what is and what is not an “investment contract,”
courts apply the Howey Test. 25
1.3 Judicial Analysis of the Term “Investment Contract” in SEC v. Howey
The legal meaning of security has been established mainly from the statutory term
“investment contract.”26 Courts, which must follow Supreme Court precedent, have attempted to
reach a workable definition.27 Therefore, the courts have formulated various tests and approaches
to establish the criteria for an investment contract. 28
SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp was the first case to deal with the investment contract
issue. 29 In order to determine whether a security existed, the Court looked to the “terms of the
offer,” “the plan of distribution,” and the “economic inducements that were held out to the
prospective prospect.” 30

19

State v. Robbins, 185 Minn. 202, 205 N.W. 456 (1932). (Defendants sold muskrats under profit-sharing
agreement.).
20
United States v. Freiberg, 34 F. App’x 281, 282 (2002). (Ostrich breeding venture was considered as a security.).
21
SEC v. Pyne, 33 F. Supp. 988, 989 (D. Mass. 1940). (Fishing boat shares were considered as a security.).
22
SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 397 (2004). (Buyers received fixed amount of money depending on being member
of the program.)
23
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946). (Buyers received profit from their farmlands where the issuer
managed the whole process.).
24
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES LITIGATION 38 (7th ed. 2017).
25
SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2001).
26
HAZEN, supra note 13.
27
HAZEN, supra note 13.
28
HAZEN, supra note 13.
29
SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 348 (1943). (Defendants were offering exploration as an
investment.)
30
Id. at 353; THOMAS LEE HAZEN & DAVID L. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 18 (2003);
HAZEN, supra note 13, at 30.
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However, SEC v. Howey (the Howey case) was one of the most important cases for the
definition of investment contracts. 31 In terms of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, an investment contract
is “a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise
and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.” 32 The
investment contract classification expresses a flexible principle instead of a static principle. 33
In the Howey case, the company sold farmlands where the company maintained orange
groves. 34 However, the company also offered management contracts with the sale of these
farmlands.35 In these management contracts, the company promised to raise, harvest, market, and
sell the orange groves.36 The Court indicated that offering farmlands with a management contract
could be a security.37 The Court did not define the term “security,” and instead looked at the
investment package as a whole.38 Even the way these management contracts were marketed was
important in the Court’s decision.39 Therefore, how it is being presented is more significant than
what is being offered.40
To understand the Howey Test better, we need to analyze the four prongs of the test that
the court used. While analyzing these prongs, decisions from other courts will be analyzed to
help us understand how we should interpret the Howey Test. Other courts have further
interpreted and improved the Howey decision.
31

SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
Id. at 299. (Interestingly, Canada also adopted a test similar to the Howey Test in their security law. Canadian
authorities look at four prongs: an investment of money, in a common enterprise, with the expectation of profit, to
come significantly from the efforts of others. Cryptocurrency Offerings, CANADIAN SECURITIES
ADMINISTRATORS (CSA Staff Notice 46-307, Aug. 24, 2017), http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_csa_
20170824_cryptocurrency-offerings.htm.)
33
Id. at 299.
34
Id at 295.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
HAZEN, supra note 13, at 31.
38
HAZEN, supra note 13, at 31.
39
HAZEN, supra note 13, at 31.
40
HAZEN, supra note 13, at 31.
32

8
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1.3.1 An Investment of Money Requirement

The Supreme Court stated that an investor in securities law is a person who invests his or
her money. According to subsequent case law, the investment of services or property instead of
money can satisfy this prong.41
In order to understand precisely what the term “investment of money” means, the SEC
and the courts ordinarily implement the analysis from Teamsters v. Daniel.42 In this particular
case, the problem was whether noncontributory, mandatory pension plans generate an investment
contract according to the meaning of the federal securities law. The trial court applied the Howey
Test in order to determine whether this pension plan was a security. The trial court found that the
retirement plan offered by the employer was a security. However, the Supreme Court reversed
the trial court’s decision since there was no investment of money in this case. The Court said that

41
42

HAZEN, supra note 13, at 31.
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel 439 U.S. 551, 553 (1979).

9

the individual who was supposed to be an investor had decided to give up a particular
consideration in order to get a separable financial interest. 43
In its reasoning, the Court stated that contributions from the employer to these employee
pension plans were relatively unimportant for the employee’s total compensation package. The
Court also thought that an employee who participated in this program made no payment to the
pension fund. The Court further asserted that the worker was not primarily selling labor to make
an investment. However, the main purpose of the employee’s labor was to earn a salary. 44
There were other reasons why the Court did not recognize these retirement plans as being
a security. According to congressional and administrative records, employment pension plans
were not securities, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 had provided
individuals in these kinds of plans with the right to challenge decisions. 45 All in all, the
mandatory, employer-funded retirement plan did not satisfy the criteria of the Howey Test.
Therefore, there were not any investment contracts or securities. 46
Investing money in return for profit will satisfy this prong. 47 Besides that, the investment
of service or property can also satisfy the investment of money requirement. 48 Therefore, while
deciding whether there is an investment of money, the courts look for the intention of the
investors. If the investors gave up some considerations in order to receive some financial interest,
the court may find that there was an investment of money.
1.3.2 A Common Enterprise Requirement

43

Id.
Id. at 560.
45
HAZEN & RATNER, supra note 30, at 32.
46
HAZEN & RATNER, supra note 30, at 34.
47
SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir. 2001).
48
HAZEN, supra note 24, at 41.
44

10

A common enterprise is another prong for determining the existence of an investment
contract according to the Howey Test. The common enterprise requirement concentrates on
whether the success of the investor’s interest rises or falls with other individuals who participate
in the enterprise. Whether commonality exists is a critical question because the Howey Test will
not be satisfied without a finding of a common enterprise. 49
According to court decisions, there are two sorts of commonality: horizontal and vertical.
Courts have different opinions on whether horizontal commonality or vertical commonality

Commonality

Horizontal

Vertical commonality

Commonality

Broad Vertical

Strict Vertical

Commonality

Commonality

©

49

HAZEN, supra note 24, at 41-2.
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satisfies the Howey Test.
Horizontal commonality focuses on the collection of “every individual investor’s fortune
to the fortunes of the other investors by the pooling of assets.” 50 Pooling of interests among at
least two investors is the most obvious example of horizontal commonality. 51
Vertical commonality focuses on the connection between the issuer and the investors.
There are two variances of vertical commonality: broad vertical commonality and strict vertical
commonality. For broad vertical commonality, the investor’s fortunes rely upon the promoter’s
efforts and expertise.52 On the contrary, narrow vertical commonality requires that the investor’s
profits be linked to the manager’s earnings. 53 What this means is that narrow vertical
commonality requiers investors’ fortunes to be mixed with and reliant upon the success of the
promoters.54
Some courts accept horizontal commonality for deciding there is a common enterprise. 55
Some courts hold that a common enterprise can also exist with vertical commonality. 56 Some
courts have decided that broad vertical commonality is able to satisfy the Howey, 57 while other
courts reject broad vertical commonality. 58
1.3.3 An Expectation of Profit Requirement

50

HAZEN & RATNER, supra note 30, at 26.
HAZEN, supra note 24, at 42.
52
James D. Gordon III, Defining a Common Enterprise in Investment Contracts, 72 OHIO ST. L. J. 59, 61 (2011).
53
Id.
54
SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1974).
55
SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 1974).
56
SEC v. Unique Financial Concepts, 196 F.3d 1195, 1199 (11th Cir. 1999)
57
SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir. 2001).
58
Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 1994).
51

12

If the investor does not have an expectation of profit, this will prevent a finding of a
security. 59 The profit motive must be at a certain level.

60

If the purchasers’ main purpose is

utilizing the product rather than making a profit, there would be no expectation of profit. 61
The Supreme Court has recognized an expectation of profit in two circumstances: capital
gain from the original investment or participation in earnings resulting from the usage of the
investor’s money.62
If the promoter promised to share a fixed income stream, this could satisfy the
expectation of profit requirement.63 According to the Court, there is no difference between fixed
return and variable return.64 The seller stated that purchasers do not participate in the earnings of
the enterprise; however, the buyers received a fixed rate of return. 65 This did not change the
overall result.
1.3.4 Efforts of Others Requirement
According to the Howey Test, the investors’ return needs to have been anticipated “solely
from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.”66 However, other courts interpreted this rule
differently and concluded that the profits should be expected from “mainly or considerably from
the efforts of others.”67

59

HAZEN, supra note 8, at 44.
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
61
Id. at 857.
62
Forman, 421 U.S. at 852.
63
SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 (2004); HAZEN, supra note 13, at 32.
64
Edwards, 540 U.S. at 394.
65
Id. at 389.
66
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
67
SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973).
60
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If the efforts of the investor were significant to the success of the enterprise, there would
be no investment contract.68 This means that the courts do not strictly follow the Howey Test in
terms of being solely from the efforts of others. Courts consider the word “solely” out of the
fourth element.69 Actually, this interpretation of the efforts of others is more accurate than the
Howey Test. The reason behind this idea is that we can protect investors from pyramid schemes.
In order to avoid the Howey Test, perpetrators make the investor participate in the scheme and,
in that way, it is no longer solely the efforts of others.
Though investors needed to put in a little effort to get a return, if the enterprise depends
on upper management to be successful, there is still an investment contract. 70 The SEC and the
courts try to protect investors through the interpretation of case law.
In contrast, if the investors have significant power over the enterprise, it would be
sufficient evidence that there is no managerial effort of others. 71 Therefore, even if the investor
needs to participate somewhat in an operation, like in pyramid sales arrangements, if the effort is
not crucial for the success of the enterprise, there will be an investment contract. 72
We cannot assume that every effort of the promoter satisfies the managerial efforts of
others prong. For example, post-investment services that are just ministerial cannot be adequate
to fulfill this prong.73
The Howey Test is not the only test courts apply. The Risk Capital Test is the second the
most important test for many state courts.
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1.4 Blue Sky Law and the Risk Capital Test
Not only federal courts and the SEC but also state courts and organizations are authorized
to regulate securities law within their region. In the beginning, securities law arose from state
regulations. 74 The first state that applied the “blue sky” law was Kansas. 75 In 1911, Kansas
started to regulate the industrialists to protect the state farmers. 76 This is significant because
Kansas regulated securities law 22 years before the federal government. Kansas was trying to
stop sale of the “blue sky” to its farmers for a simple fee. 77 In this context, “blue sky” is a
metaphor describing an invaluable investment in exchange for some amount of money.
Today, all states have their own “blue sky” laws.78 However, this blue sky law varies
state to state.79 For example, an issuer in New York is not required to register with the New York
securities administration department, but the state enforces antifraud provisions against the
issuers.80 On the other hand, California requires an issuer to pass the merit test to sell securities
in the state.81
Blue sky law allows states to protect their citizens from securities fraud. For some states,
the blue sky law allows investors to obtain material information of relevant facts. 82 According to
one commentator, research in blue sky law is always difficult. 83 Since the law varies state to state,
it is highly unlikely that there would be uniformity in its application.
With the 1996 National Securities Markets Improvement Act, the federal government
wanted to limit the states’ influence on securities law in terms of state registration
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requirements.84 However, state laws did not lose their importance in protecting against fraudulent
transactions.85
Therefore, we need to look at the other test that states have applied in order to understand
which instruments are investment contracts. Apart from the dominance of the Howey Test, the
other test implemented by state courts is the Risk Capital Test. 86
Some state courts have been following Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski decided by
California Supreme Court, which was the first instance of the so-called Risk Capital Test. 87 The
Supreme Court of Hawaii, Arkansas, District Court of Guam, Court of Appeals of Ohio,
Supreme Court of Oregon follow this decision. 88 Alaska, North Dakota, Georgia, Michigan,
Washington, Oklahoma have also adopted this Risk Capital Test by statute. 89 There are some
regulatory rules in New Mexico, Wisconsin, Wyoming, North Carolina, and Illinois that follow
the Risk Capital Test.90
The critical part of the Risk Capital Test is that the investors should rely upon others for
the success of the business 91 and that the promoter uses the activity as an investment tool.92 It is
very similar to the Howey Test; however, the test has some considerable differences. The Risk
Capital Test has four key prongs:
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(1) An offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and (2) a portion of this initial
value is subjected to the risks of the enterprise, and (3) the furnishing of the initial
value is induced by the offeror's promises or representations which give rise to a
reasonable understanding that a valuable benefit of some kind, over and above the
initial value, will accrue to the offeree as a result of the operation of the
enterprise, and (4) the offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical and
actual control over the managerial decisions of the enterprise. 93
Risk Capital

Initial Value

Risk of the

Valuable

Control over

Enterprise

Benefit

Management
©

For the Risk Capital Test, it is crucial to see whether funds have been raised to develop
an enterprise. Additionally, it is important to see if the promoter presented the transaction to the
public as a whole. Aside from that, whether or not the investors are relatively powerless to affect
the success of the enterprise is also taken into account. The primary problem is whether the
investor’s fund is substantially at risk since it is insufficiently secured. 94
In Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, the court ruled that the petitioners had solicited
risk capital to develop a business for profit. 95 Even if investors do not receive any material
benefit, the court held that the securities act still protects those investors. 96
The court in the Sobieski case held that the sale of membership to a country club is a
security.97 In this case, the court made an effort to preserve the public from the financial risks
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that the promoters could possibly cause. 98 The investors risked the capital hoping to receive
some benefits from the country club. In this case, the court stated that the securities act applies
even if the investor does not expect to have any material benefits. 99 In the Howey Test, an
expectation of profit is substantial in order to determine whether the investment can be
considered a security.
For the Risk Capital Test “what investors stand to lose” is more important than “what the
investors expect to gain.” 100 Also, the Court held that the Risk Capital Test has a significant
advantage when contrasted with the Howey Test. The definition of a benefit is not as narrow as it
is in the Howey Test since a benefit does not have to be material. 101
Another court found that the offer to pay interest on an investment would be a security
according to Risk Capital Test. However, if the investors’ capital was not at risk because the
offeror secured the investment with valuable materials, such as a diamond that was worth at least
$500, then there is no risk capital since the customers were properly secured. 102
Thus, there are some differences between the Risk Capital Test and the Howey Test. The
Risk Capital Test is more flexible compared to the Howey Test. An investor does not have to
prove that there is a common enterprise. Also, under the Howey Test, the anticipated return must
be substantial. Nevertheless, the Risk Capital Test does not concentrate on substantial benefit.
For instance, interest in a golf club satisfied the Risk Capital Test in California. On the other
hand, since there was no expectation of profit, it would not be a security according to the Howey
Test.103
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Generally, state courts that follow the Risk Capital Test apply both the Howey Test and
the Risk Capital Test. Therefore, if the instrument fulfills the definition of a security under one of
the tests, courts hold that an instrument is a security. State courts that do not follow the Risk
Capital Test follow the Howey Test in order to decide whether an instrument is a security. 104
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CHAPTER 2: ANALYSIS OF ICOS ACCORDING TO U.S. SECURITIES LAW
This chapter will analyze Initial Coin Offerings (ICO) in terms of the Howey and Risk
Capital Tests. If the tokens pass these tests, it is likely that they will be considered securities,
whether in a federal court or a state court. The issuers should look at these regulations when
issuing tokens; if they are likely to pass these tests, the issuers should consider the solutions I
discuss in the last section.105
First, I will analyze what an ICO is. While explaining what an ICO is, I will discuss the
differences and similarities between ICOs and Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). Then, I will
describe the differences between payment, utility, and security tokens. There are no certain
borders between these tokens, though. One token can be a utility token in the beginning, and then
later become a payment token. Applicable law will be different according to the type of token
involved.
Federal courts and many state courts follow the Howey Test to decide whether there is an
investment contract and, therefore, a security. 106 If there is a security, these courts will apply
securities law to these transactions. On the other hand, as we mentioned in the first chapter, some
state courts apply the Risk Capital Test to determine whether the scheme is a security. 107 This
analysis will review the Howey Test more than the Risk Capital Test since the application of the
Risk Capital Test is geographically limited.108
2.1 What is an ICO?
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The ICO is a concept that describes a means of a new fundraising event. In the ICO
process, companies or individuals sell their tokens to the public. This part of the token sale only
focuses on the transaction from the issuer to the first buyer. This means that the ICO does not
focus on secondary market activities.
Tokens give some individual rights to their owners in exchange for fiat money like the
U.S. dollar, Chinese Yuan, European Euro or payment tokens like Bitcoin or Ethereum. 109 These
rights will determine the types of tokens the issuer sells. Typically, companies explain in their
white paper how the system works, what kind of rights the buyer will receive, and how
purchasers will receive a return from the process. 110
While reducing transaction cost, ICOs offer unique liquidity and efficiency for companies
as well as individuals. 111 Beginning from Mastercoin in 2013, there are many ICOs held by
people.112 Until now, companies were able to raise millions of dollars in a short period of time.
2.2 Similarities and Differences between an ICO and an IPO
The name of the ICO (initial coin offering) is very similar to IPO (initial public offering).
Therefore, ICOs are generally compared to IPOs, which is the process that companies use to sell
their shares to the public for the first time. 113
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The main similarity between an ICO and an IPO is that they are both a fund-raising
mechanism for companies. When companies and people are in need of funds, one way to raise
money is issuing stocks and selling them to the public. Also, with token sales, the companies
receive the capital from the market.
There are many differences between ICOs and IPOs. The first difference is that, while
companies in their early stages use ICOs, well-settled companies use IPOs. 114 The other
difference between ICOs and IPOs is that, while IPOs are undoubtedly subject to the 1933 Act
and the 1934 Act, ICOs may or may not be subject to these Acts.
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procedure is such an extended process that it involves hiring investment banking and securities
law attorneys.116 On the other hand, individuals can create tokens through a blockchain system,
explain how it works to the public, and start fundraising events without these intermediaries.
While the ICO process is shorter and cheaper, the investors are less secure compared to the IPO
process.
Furthermore, in an IPO, businesses sell their ownership rights to the public; on the other
hand, most ICOs do not give equity or ownership interests to the buyers. 117 While shareholders
have rights in a company’s bankruptcy, token holders generally do not have a claim to the
company’s assets since there are no ownership rights on the company.
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2.3 Categorization of Tokens
This section will examine three different kinds of tokens: payment tokens, security tokens,
and utility tokens. The differences among these tokens are significant because, based on the
status of token, the applicable law can be changed. As an example, while payment tokens are
considered a commodity, security tokens are considered a security. Utility tokens are found
somewhere in the middle. The Securities and Exchange Office and Commodity Futures Trading
Commission always watch the activities in these markets.
Tokens can be used in a broader range than cryptocurrencies. 118 Cryptocurrencies
represent inherent value; however, they do not include legal tender status. 119 This thesis analyzes
cryptocurrencies under payment tokens. In contrast to payment tokens, a utility token can give
some access rights to its holders. 120 Also, security tokens give their owner some particular
ownership rights, such as getting dividends or voting about the company’s decisions. 121
According to one study, the tokens are used for 44% as a payment token, 35% a utility
token, 14% as an investment token.122 According to another survey that includes all initial coin
offerings between 2013 to 2017, approximately 75% of all tokens were used to access to a
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service, 50% were used as payment, 25% were granted for investment and some other reasons. 123
These differences arise most likely from different understandings of categorizations. 124
Therefore, this thesis will analyze three types of tokens in terms of securities law. Even if
the general category gives some ideas, every individual token should be examined in order to
reach a solid conclusion.125

Tokens

Payment
Utility

Security Tokens
Utility Tokens

2.3.1 Payment Tokens
Payment tokens, in other words cryptocurrencies, have inherent value like gold or cash
that are designated to enable sales, purchases, and other transactions. Many of the payment
tokens are promoted as providing the same functions as the U.S. dollar, Turkish Lira, Chinese
Yuan, etc. but without being backed by a government or other financial institution. 126
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Cryptocurrencies are marketed for different reasons. People generally try to get
cryptocurrency to transfer their money without an intermediary, such as a bank. Also, in the
cryptocurrency system, there are no geographic limitations, and the cost of transactions is lower
than the banking system.
Generally, U.S.-based cryptocurrency trading platforms are regulated as money
transmission services. These money transmission systems have not been subject to direct
overview by the SEC or the CFTC. 127 The Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN) regulates the money transmission systems. 128
In general, the SEC only regulates securities transactions and the companies who
participate in the securities market. The SEC does not have the right to control the transactions in
currencies and commodities and money trading platforms. 129
It is not essential to the SEC if a company chooses to refer to its tokens as a
cryptocurrency. The SEC always looks for what the real thing is under that name. Simply calling
something a currency or a currency-based product does not mean it is not a security and is not
going to be subject to SEC regulations.130
Bitcoin is one example of a payment token. According to CFTC, Bitcoin is a commodity.
131

Also, according to Jay Clayton, the president of the SEC, Bitcoin is not a security but a
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medium of exchange.132 In another case, the Court found that Bitcoin was a medium of exchange,
a store of value, and a means of payment.133 If a token has similar characteristics to Bitcoin, it
will most likely be treated as a commodity.
2.3.2 Utility Tokens
Utility tokens, which can be called app coins or app tokens, offer users access to
merchandise or services. 134 There are two types of utility tokens issuers sell to the people: prefunctional and fully-functional.
People can find out whether a token is pre-functional or fully-functional from the
company’s white papers. If the white paper indicates that the issuer will develop the system after
the fund-raising event, then the token is most likely a pre-functional security token. On the other
hand, if the issuer has already built the system, then the token is most likely a fully-functional
utility token.
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Issuers of tokens sometimes prepare Initial Coin Offerings for utility tokens. For example,
Filecoin was a pre-functional utility token. It raised $257 million to provide a decentralized
cloud storage service.135 ICO funders received tokens that they could use to purchase storage
space from Filecoin once the company had launched the service. 136 Also, the Munchee token can
be considered under this section. The Munchee token was used as a form of payment in
restaurants to incentivize food reviews. It also allowed its holders to trade in secondary
trading.137 This means that the Munchee token was not only a payment token but also a utility
token and a security token at the same time. 138
While pre-functional utility tokens are most likely an investment contract, fullyfunctional utility tokens are not. For the fully-functional utility tokens, there would be no
expectation of profit from the efforts of others. 139 If the instrument has consumptive value, like
fully-functional utility tokens, it would not be a security since there is no expectation of profit
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from the efforts of others.140 On the other hand, pre-functional utility tokens are most likely an
investment contract since the holders do not have the right to consume. They need to wait until
the issuer develops the system.
2.3.3 Security Tokens
Security tokens are equivalent to traditional securities; however, issuers created them on
decentralized or centralized ledger systems. From time to time, these tokens offer cash flow or
voting rights. Sometimes they are just labeled as security tokens. 141
Issuers of security tokens who hope to raise money to develop a business generally sell
tokens rather than sell shares, issue notes, or obtain bank support. 142 Investors invest their money
with the expectation of profit supported by the issuer’s effort.
Even if the token itself is not a security, like the citrus groves in the Howey Test, the
same asset can be offered in a way that causes investors to have a reasonable expectation of
profit based on the efforts of others. For example, Bitcoin itself is not a security according to
William Hinman, the Director of Division of Corporation Finance. 143 However, in Shavers, the
court concluded that the scheme involving Bitcoin was an investment contract and, therefore,
was a security contract.144 DAO tokens can be considered under these tokens. 145
2.4 Howey Test for ICOs
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2.4.1 Whether or Not ICOs Satisfy the Investment of Money Prong?
Issuers sell a number of tokens for cash. 146 In terms of the Howey Test, these ICOs
definitely satisfy the investment of money prong.147 The reason is that these ICOs include the
same type of investment with the Howey Test.148 On the other hand, some ICOs include sales of
tokens for other payment tokens.149 These token sales also satisfy the investment of money prong
since in the Shavers case, even though the defendant claimed that Bitcoin cannot represent an
investment of money, the court ruled that the investment of money prong can be satisfied even
when there is no legal tender status. 150
Sale of tokens is not the only way the token holder receives tokens. Issuers can offer
tokens for participation in the token ecosystem. 151 The best example of this would be the Filecoin
tokens. Filecoin completed its ICO in 2017; however, the issuer offered tokens to the individuals
who provided storage to the Filecoin system. 152 As I discussed in the first chapter, according to
case law, investment of services can also satisfy the investment of money prong. 153 Since the
investors chose to give up usage of their computers as an investment of service in Filecoin, it is
highly likely that the court would find that the mining service satisfied the investment of money
prong.154
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On the other hand, not every investment of service satisfies the investment of money
prong. Courts generally look at the whole picture to decide whether the activity fulfills this prong.
As we remember from Teamsters v. Daniel, the plaintiff’s investment of service was not
considered as investment of money. 155 However, this case can be easily distinguished from
Filecoin since the participants tried to get a reward in exchange for service. In Teamsters v.
Daniel, the main purpose for the employee was earning a salary rather than interest in the
pension plan. Therefore, the pension plan was not considered an investment contract. 156
Investment of service in ICOs most likely satisfies the investment of money prong.
2.4.2. Whether or not ICOs Satisfy Common Enterprise Prong?
Specific features of ICOs are used to determine whether there is a common enterprise. As
I discussed in the first chapter, there are three types of commonality tests that courts use to define
a common enterprise in investment contracts: 157 horizontal, broad vertical, and strict vertical. 158
When the issuers of tokens pool the money from their investors to develop a network,
horizontal commonality can be found easily. 159 Utility tokens can be evaluated under horizontal
commonality since the issuer pools the investors’ money to develop an application. 160
When the value of tokens issued for the ICOs relies on the expertise of the issuer, such as
developing an application, the initial coin offering may involve broad vertical commonality. 161
Many tokens satisfy the broad vertical commonality test since the investors generally depend on
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the expertise of the issuers. For example, the investors of Filecoin depended on the expertise of
the Filecoin managers to develop the decentralized data storage system. 162
On the other hand, if the value of tokens depends on the issuer’s profits, dividends, or
other kinds of returns, there would be a narrow vertical commonality. 163 In this context, if the
promoter is successful, the investor will receive the profits. However, these kinds of tokens are
rare.164
2.4.3 Whether or Not ICOs Satisfy the Expectation of Profit Prong?
The specific features of tokens should be evaluated according to the expectation of profit
prong. Primary objectives of buyers will determine the results. Of course, when deciding the
primary reason for the token holders, we should also look at the whitepaper to see what the issuer
promised. Especially in terms of utility tokens, this prong is very important.
It is necessary for us to evaluate whether the buyers get the tokens to use, to consume, or
to invest.165 If the token holders have an expectation of the increased value of initial investment
or participation in the profit sharing, this Howey prong can be satisfied. 166 For instance, the
Munchee company explained in its white paper that the buyers should expect to receive a profit
from holding the tokens.167
What kind of benefits the token holders will receive is significant when deciding whether
the token holders reasonably expected profits.168 If the issuers claim the token will gain value or
the holders will receive financial benefits from holding the token, then the token satisfies the
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expectation of profit prong of the Howey Test. On the other hand, if the benefits are based on
goods or services to exchange, the token cannot be considered a security since the primary
expectation is not gaining a profit.169
Some commentators argue that utility tokens may be produced or bought for two
purposes.170 First, the token holders can use the token to receive goods or services. 171 This part is
unrelated with the field of the securities law. Second, the holders have an expectation of profit
from buying and selling the token. 172 This expectation can create an investment contract;
therefore, there is a security. The main function of the token will determine the result. 173 If the
purchaser’s primary purpose is just using the token for the services the issuer provides, the
expectation of profit prong will not be satisfied. On the other hand, if the seller says or implies
that the token holder may receive profits from holding the tokens, courts may find that the issuer
created an expectation of profit, even if the token could only be used for buying goods or
services.174
2.4.4. Whether or Not ICOs Satisfy Managerial Efforts of Others Prong?
Control powers of buyers over the tokens and the token venture is important in the
evaluation of ICOs.175 The degree of control will determine whether they relied primarily on the
managerial controls of others. To figure out what degree of control the buyers have, we need to
look the rights, obligations, and powers the token provides. 176
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If the token holders have plenty of rights and powers to manage the token venture, an
initial coin offering is unlikely to depend on the managerial efforts of others. 177 On the other
hand, if the token holders have restricted rights on the venture, the token holders most likely rely
on the managerial efforts of others.178 Therefore, it is critical to look at the white paper of the
initial coin offerings to see who is going to be responsible for making the profit.
Pre-purchase and post-purchase efforts would be another thing we need to focus on while
we are looking at the managerial efforts of others prong. 179 If the token issuer performed the
managerial efforts after the token sale, there would most likely be an investment contract. 180
However, if the post-purchase efforts were ministerial or clerical rather than managerial, there
would not be an investment contract. 181
2.5 Risk Capital Test for ICOs
The Risk Capital Test is one of the tests that some states apply to determine whether
instruments, schemes, or transactions are securities.182 Since the Risk Capital Test application is
limited geographically, scholars have analyzed this test less than they have the Howey Test.
However, it is essential for the issuer of the tokens to know whether the token is a security or not.
According to this result, the issuer may or may not need to register the tokens at the state level as
well.
There is a possibility for the issuer that the token is not a security under federal law, but it
is a security under state law. As I discussed in the first chapter, while the Howey Test is looking
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for commonality and expectation of essential profit, the Risk Capital Test looks for some profit
from the instrument and is not interested in the commonality. 183
While we are considering whether the token is a security under the Risk Capital Test, we
need to focus on four prongs:184 1) whether the token buyers give an initial value to the token
issuer, 2) whether this initial value is subject to the risk of the token venture, 3) whether the
token holder expects some valuable benefits, and 4) the token holder does not have the right to
control the venture.185 If these four prongs are satisfied, then the token should be registered in
states that use the Risk Capital Test to determine whether the instrument is a security. 186
In terms of payment tokens, there is no difference between fully-functional utility tokens
and security tokens under the Howey Test and the Risk Capital Test. Payment tokens and fullyfunctional utility tokens have consumptive value; therefore, they are not securities under either
test. Security tokens satisfy both the Howey and Risk Capital Tests.
However, in terms of pre-functional utility tokens, the Risk Capital Test can provide a
more solid solution than the Howey Test can. Generally, for pre-functional utility tokens, issuers
raise capital to develop the application. The buyer can then put her money at risk with this
investment. Therefore, in terms of the Risk Capital Test, there would be no confusion whether
this is an investment contract.187
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The general assumption is that, if the token satisfies the Howey Test, it will most likely
fulfill the Risk Capital Test.188 The Risk Capital Test tries to protect investors more than the
Howey Test while reducing the level of expectation of profit and commonality. Therefore, token
issuers should exercise caution when offering their tokens in states that apply the Risk Capital
Test.189
There have been some recent decisions made by the North Dakota securities office
regarding ICOs.190 As Chapter 1 explained, states have the right to protect their citizens from
fraudulent schemes.191 In order to protect North Dakota’s citizens, the securities office created an
ICO Task Force department.192 Since this department protects citizens from securities fraud, it
must be analyzed under blue sky laws.
As we know, North Dakota is one of the states that applies the Risk Capital Test to
determine whether an instrument is a security. 193 The North Dakota Securities Commission
implemented securities law to several ICOs. One example is Magma Coin. 194 The company
fraudulently alleged that the coin was backed by Gold and ETFs. 195 The names of the executive
team members were also fake. 196 North Dakota’s ICO Task Force explained that whitepapers
generally represent the “idea.” As far as we discussed in the Risk Capital Test section, tokens
188
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that involve only ideas would be considered securities. Therefore, they would need to be
registered before they can be sold in North Dakota.
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CHAPTER 3: ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL TOKENS: THE GRAY AREA
So far, this thesis has analyzed the Howey Test, the Risk Capital Test, ICOs, and
different types of tokens. However, while deciding whether individual tokens are securities,
lawyers should look at the token closely. There are small differences that can change the overall
result. The SEC and the courts do not focus on every prong from the Howey and the Risk Capital
Tests while determining whether a specific token is a security. The SEC and the courts should
have made a more detailed decision to clarify whether the old law fits into the new token system.
This part of the thesis will analyze the XRP token, the Munchee Token, the Storj Token,
and the DAO token. There are several discussions we can make on these tokens to clarify some
parts of the Howey and Risk Capital Tests. The reason I chose these tokens is that they are the
leaders of their fields.
3.1 Whether XRP Token Is a Security under California Law and the Federal Law?
Ripple created XRP to solve the problem of Denial of Service Attacks. 197 Denial of
Service Attacks occurs when someone maliciously creates many identities in a distributed ledger
system to exercise considerable influence on the ledger system. 198 If there are enough requests
from the attackers, consensus process substantially disrupts the settlement process. 199 XRP, like
Bitcoin, is a math-based cryptocurrency. 200 The difference between XRP and Bitcoin is that,
while the publicly distributed ledger system controls Bitcoin, Ripple ledger system approves
transactions for the XRP tokens.201
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To determine whether XRP is a security or commodity, professionals need to analyze
whether there is an investment contract. XRP is a very questionable token that there is a class
action lawsuit in California.202 California state applies Risk Capital Test; on the other hand, the
federal courts apply the Howey Test. 203
Buyers of the XRP tokens sued Ripple, XRP II and the CEO of the Company. The
plaintiffs alleged that Ripple, XRP II, and the CEO indorsed, sold and solicited the sale of XRP
and raised millions of dollars. Plaintiffs are claiming that XRP is unregistered security tokens
and there is no valid exemption for not being registered. 204
According to SEC, securities cannot be sold without registration if there is no valid
exemption from the registration. Also, Jay Clinton Chairman of the SEC stated that changing the
traditional corporate interest which is recorded in a central ledger to blockchain entry on
distributed ledger may not change the substance. 205 Therefore, we should apply the Howey Test
and Risk Capital Test to these tokens.
Investment of Money: Plaintiffs analyzed the XRP tokens regarding the Howey Test and
the Risk Capital Test. People can purchase the XRP tokens with U.S. dollars, Euro or other
cryptocurrencies.206 As we know from the Shavers case, investment of Bitcoin is also considered
as an investment of money.207 Therefore, we can conclude that the plaintiffs satisfied the first
prong of the Howey Test which is an investment of money.
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Plaintiffs state that XRP token is not only as a means of exchange but also investment
contract.208 In this respect, plaintiffs claim that XRP token is not only a payment token but also
an investment token. If XRP is only payment token, it is a commodity. 209 On the other hand, if it
covers investment token, it cannot be considered just as a commodity.
The expectation of profits: according to plaintiffs Ripple does hold not only the tokens
but also improves the XRP network. Ripple changed many functions of the XRP token such as
decreasing transaction time, improving system security and compatibility. 210 Ripple also released
a white paper regarding return on investments. 211 Ripple is making statements about the return
of investments about XRP tokens. Therefore, Ripple’s statement creates an expectation of profit
for the buyers.
Managerial Efforts of Others: Plaintiffs main argument in their complaint letter that
Ripple manages, controls, and improves the XRP token. They distinguished the XRP token from
the Bitcoin and Ethereum. They stated that Ripple created the XRP token and gave 20% to the
founders of Ripple and 80% held in the company. The Ripple company sells this 80 % in order
to raise fund and improve the company operations. In this respect, XRP tokens are centralized if
we compare with the Bitcoin and Ethereum. 212
Plaintiffs provided several statements from the Ripple announcements. These statements
indicate that Ripple has authority on the XRP. For example, Ripple announced that Ripple put
$55B in an escrow account and the managers of XRP tweeted this as a big success of the XRP. 213
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Plaintiffs also claimed that Ripple markets the XRP token, drive demand and tries to
increase the price of XRP. Ripple shows in his website that how people can buy the XRP
tokens.214 Ripple mentioned in its website that the Ripple company committed to the health and
stability for the XRP in the long run. 215
According to plaintiffs, the Ripple Company’s primary source of income is coming from
the sale of XRP to the investors. Therefore, the price of the XRP token directly tied to the
managerial skills and efforts of Ripple.216 Also, Ripple stated that Ripple would accelerate the
speed of XRP ledger to build on speed, uptime, and scalability. 217 Ripple announced that the
company would ensure XRP is the most trusted digital currency. 218 All these factors show that
Ripple is the only authority in the management of XRP tokens.
In a Common Enterprise: plaintiffs just mentioned the common enterprise prong in their
complain letter.219 They did not make detailed analysis for this prong. The reason behind this
would be that the courts and governmental organizations can easily find out horizontal
commonality in ICOs. 220 Ripple sold the XRP tokens and pooled the money to improve the
system; therefore, there is a horizontal commonality.
Risk Capital Test: Plaintiffs sued the Ripple company in California. Therefore, the court
will also analyze the Risk Capital Test. Plaintiffs argued that Ripple uses the XRP funds to
operate its business, the Ripple Company offers XRP tokens for sale to the public at large,
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plaintiffs do not have the power to control the success of Ripple, and plaintiffs’ investment is
substantially at risk.221
In this case, plaintiffs made a wise movement that they sue the Ripple Company in
California. As we discussed in the second chapter, the Risk Capital Test is more protective than
the Howey Test. 222 Since Risk Capital Test does not focus on common enterprise and
expectation of essential profit prongs, the declaration of security token is more straightforward.
On the other hand, the defendants are trying to move the case from State Court to the Federal
Court.223 I think that the main reason behind this request is that the defendants do not want to be
subject to Risk Capital Test since it is more protective than the Howey Test.
3.2 Whether MUN Token, Which Is Pre-functional Utility Token Promising Profit, Can Be
Considered a Security?
MUN token is very significant since it is one of the representatives of pre-functional
utility tokens. For pre-functional utility tokens, issuers generally raise fund in order to develop
the application. Even if the token had some functions, the company raised the capital for further
developments. Also, the company created faith to make a profit for the people.
Munchee Incorporation (Munchee) created MUN token and sold in October and
November 2017.224 The SEC commenced an administrative proceeding for Munchee. Munchee
submitted an Offer of Settlement to the SEC.225 SEC accepted this settlement.226
Munchee is a privately-owned Delaware company based in California created an iPhone
app for restaurant reviews. Munchee Inc wanted to recruit users to write evaluations, sell food
221
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and conduct some other transactions using MUN tokens. 227 Munchee stated in their white paper
that MUN tokens would be more valuable because of Munchee’s efforts. 228
Munchee started developing the Munchee Application in late 2015. They launched the
application in 2017. In October 2017, Munchee announced Munchee would launch an initial coin
offering for the sale of MUN tokens. Munchee in its white paper explained how the company
will use the raised funds, how people will get a return from this investment. Munchee created
500 million MUN tokens and planned to sell 225 million in the initial coin offering process. 229
The rest of the MUN tokens held by the company to improve the company’s business, hire new
people, pay the employees, and facilitate future advertisement. 230 Munchee offered MUN tokens
to build a profitable enterprise for the MUN holders.231
Even if Munchee told that holders of MUN tokens could buy goods and services through
its website, no one could purchase these goods and services in this period. 232 This was because
the system was not fully completed.
Munchee explained how MUN tokens gain value with the Munchee ecosystem. After the
initial coin offering of MUN token, Munchee may burn some Munchee tokens which are held by
the company. Also, the company said the advertisement rate in Munchee’s website would
increase since many restaurants will want to be advertised. 233
We need to discuss the prongs from the Howey Test in order to understand whether the
Munchee tokens are the securities.
227
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Investment of money: Munchee created 500 million MUN tokens in Ethereum
blockchain and declared that Munchee would not create an additional token. 234 Munchee sold
MUN tokens to raise around $15 million that Munchee Inc could improve its existing app. 235
Investors paid Bitcoin or Ether to buy the MUN tokens.236 According to the Shavers case, it is
enough for the satisfying investment of Money. 237
The Expectation of Profit: in the advertisements of MUN ICO, Munchee made several
public statements that if the people are early enough, they will likely get a return on it. Munchee
offered to give MUN tokens the people who advertise the tokens in social platforms such as
BitcoinTalk.org.238 Even if Munchee did not offer any dividend or other periodic payment, the
company created an expectation for the token will be more valuable. 239 Also, Munchee promised
to provide a secondary trading market for the MUN tokens. 240
Efforts of the Munchee Inc: Buyers of Munchee tokens would have the expectation of
profit from the Munchee’s effort. Munchee’s whitepaper indicated that the founders of the
company worked at prominent technology companies and they have excellent skills for running a
business and creating software. 241 Investors of MUN tokens had little effect on the price of
tokens.242 Therefore, they relied on Munchee’s expertise.
SEC just mentioned in the order that MUN tokens had a practical use at the time of
offering. However, it did not stop SEC from concluding that MUN tokens are not securities but
234
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utility tokens.243 SEC should have analyzed this prong to make it clear for the other token issuers.
If the token had full functions in the beginning, developing the system cannot make the token as
a security. If the MUN tokens’ holders purchased a commodity for personal consumption, SEC
or the courts could not consider it as a security. 244
In this matter, after the SEC official contacted with Munchee, the company stopped the
sale of the tokens and consented the SEC order. Also, the company returned the money the
people who had already bought the MUN tokens. Therefore, the SEC did not impose a civil
penalty to the Munchee245 This matter shows us that token sales involving potential profits most
likely qualify as securities.246
3.3. Whether Pre-Functional Non-Profit Promising Storj Token Can Be Considered a
Security?
This token is one of the unique tokens since there is no action taken by the SEC and the
courts against the Storj token. The Storj Company promises to store files for its token holders in
early 2019.247 The company’s purpose is facilitating and maintaining data storages through the
decentralized system. 248 Storj token holders can use the tokens for interaction with Storj
network.249
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Storj blockchain system motivates the token holders to give an opportunity to participate
in the system with these tokens.250 The Storj ecosystem offers two functions. The token holders
buy these decentralized storages or sell their unused storages to the system. 251 If the token holder
buys the storage from the Storj, he or she needs to pay with the Storj token. 252
Now I am going to discuss the important parts of Howey and the Risk Capital Test in
order to find the small difference. According to my analysis, Storj is an investment contract
under the Risk Capital Test, but not under the Howey Test.
The first prong of the Howey Test and Risk Capital Test can be easily satisfied for the
Storj token. People can buy these Storj tokens from Binance which is one to of the token sales
platform with Bitcoin, Ether, and other coins. According to Shavers case, Bitcoin investment can
be considered as an investment of money. 253
The second prong of the Howey Test the common enterprise, and the second prong of the
Risk Capital Test the business venture, can be easily found as well. The reason is that the Storj
company pooled all of the people’s money for developing the application. Therefore; horizontal
commonality and the business venture prong are satisfied in this case.
The third prong of the Howey Test is that the investors should depend on the managerial
efforts of others.254 Also, in the Risk Capital Test, if the investor does not have control over the
enterprise, the test can be satisfied.255 In this case, the Storj team is responsible for developing
the application. According to the whitepaper, the token holders do not have the right to control
the Storj system.
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The fourth prong for the Howey Test and the Risk Capital Test make a difference for
Storj. As we discussed in the first chapter, while the Howey Test focuses on the expectation of
essential profit, Risk Capital Test concentrates on some valuable benefits.

256

The Storj

whitepaper highlighted that the buyers do not have any intention for investment, speculation and
other financial purposes.257 Therefore, the company clarifies that there is no expectation of profit
for the Storj token. So the token fails in this prong of Howey Test. However, for the Risk Capital
Test, the result is not the same. The Storj company created these tokens for the purpose of
allowing the purchaser to use the decentralized storage system. However, the token holders do
not have the right to use these tokens now. They need to wait until early 2019. The company is
still improving the system. Therefore, in terms of Risk Capital Test there is still some valuable
benefits; therefore it an investment contract. 258
3.4 Whether Decentralized Autonomous Organization Tokens Can Be Considered a
Security?
This thesis will analyze the Decentralized Autonomous Organization (the DAO) tokens
under securities tokens. The SEC prepared a report for the DAO tokens after the attackers hacked
the DAO’s account on Ethereum Blockchain. 259 People did not have a chance to start using the
DAO tokens the way described in DAO’s whitepaper.260 However, the SEC took action against
the DAO since it did not comply with U.S. securities law. The DAO tokens are one of the most
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leading matter regarding security tokens. While analyzing other tokens, the SEC cites from this
decision.261 Therefore, it is crucial to analyze this token in a detailed manner.
In May 2016, the DAO sold approximately 1.15 billion DAO tokens in exchange for a
total of 12 million Ether which is a virtual currency (payment token) used on the Ethereum
Blockchain.262 The DAO raised $150 million from this initial coin offering. 263
The DAO is one example of a Decentralized Autonomous Organization.264 Slock.it and
co-founders of Slock.it created the DAO tokens.265 They sold DAO tokens to the public in order
to use the raised money for the projects. The holders of DAO tokens expected earnings from the
projects as a return on their investments on DAO tokens.266 Also, DAO token holders can resell
their tokens on several web-based platforms that supported secondary trading.
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In the report, SEC did not analyze whether DAO was an investment company according
to Investment Company Act of 1940. DAO did not start its business operations for funding
projects. 268 If the business were started, there would be some other questions need to be
answered as well.
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In DAO matter the organization used smart contracts for specific functions such as how
to achieve quorum, how to vote, how to prepare the contracts and so on.269 The smart contract
means that a computer-based application executes terms of the contract. 270 The smart contracts
satisfy contractual conditions, including but not limited to payment terms, liens, and
confidentiality. 271
The purchase of DAO tokens gives a right for the participant to receive rewards (this is
almost same with dividends). 272 The DAO token holders have the right to vote on contract
proposals, such as proposing the project, funding the accepted project, distributing the
anticipated earnings.273 The DAO tried to claim that the DAO was autonomous in these project
proposals.274 The DAO alleged that smart contracts controlled the whole process. 275
DAO token holders have certain voting and ownership rights. If the DAO earns money
from the projects, DAO token holders will vote whether use distribute the rewards to the token
holders or fund new projects.276
In this system, anyone had the right to buy DAO tokens as long as he or she had ETC in
exchange. DAO token holders were able to sell their DAO tokens in various ways in the
secondary market. After the offering period, the DAO promised that DAO tokens would be
freely transferable on the Ethereum Blockchain. 277
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However, DAO’s code was vulnerable to the attacks. Attackers moved 3.6 million ETH
from DAO’s Blockchain address to the attacker’s blockchain address. The DAO wanted to
eradicate the consequences of the attack. Therefore, the DAO applied for Hard Fork to the
Ethereum Blockchain. Ethereum Blockchain system accepted the Hard Fork, and the DAO
received the tokens back. 278
In order to determine whether DAO tokens are securities, the SEC applied the Howey
Test. However, the SEC did not apply every single prong of the Howey Test. In this case, SEC
so much focused on managerial efforts of others. This concentration makes sense since the core
of this case depends on this prong. The DAO system wanted to circumvent from SEC regulations
by this prong.
The DAO token holders invested their money in DAO system. Courts do not require the
cash in order to find there is an investment contract.279 Also, in SEC v. Shavers, the court holds
that investment of Bitcoin meets the requirement of Howey. 280 Participants of DAO used ETH to
make these contributions. 281

These contributions can satisfy the prong under investment

contracts under Howey.
DAO token holders anticipated getting some profits from their investment. There were
several ways the token holders could expect getting profit. First of all, the holders could receive
rewards.282 Also, through the successful projects, the value of the token would be increased. 283
Also, the token holders can get profit from the token market speculations.
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The managerial efforts of others prong is the most challenging point in this case since
DAO managers tried to give the power to the DAO token holders. In theory, the holders were
going to decide what to do.
The Supreme Court looks for whether the efforts made by the managers other than the
investor are indisputably essential regarding failure or success of the enterprise. 284 In this case,
the SEC finds out that curators had significant rights on the proposals from the DAO token
holders.285
Also, the DAO system limited the voting rights of DAO token holders through review of
the curators. The DAO tokens system some curators regulated which proposal will be voted.
According to the white paper, they had considerable power on the proposals. Also, curators had
power on the quorum; they had the power to reduce 50% every other week. 286 According to
supreme court even if the investors help to make the enterprise profitable, it may not be enough
to shift managerial efforts of others prong to the investors.287 The help from the investors should
be significant to shift this prong.288 The voting rights provided by the DAO did not provide them
with meaningful control over the enterprise. The DAO token holders did not have the
opportunity to find each other to make a decision as well. 289
It can be concluded that if the DAO token was decentralized and DAO token holders
were given the right of voting without restrictions, it would be possible that DAO token cannot
satisfy Howey and therefore it cannot be considered as security. Since the managerial efforts of
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others prong are crucial, the issuers of tokens can try to use this part to create token without
securities law applications.
On the other hand, SEC did not discuss the common enterprise prong. The SEC
recognized that common enterprise as part of the investment contract. 290 Maybe SEC sees
horizontal commonality and thinks that there is no need for discussion. It is evident from the
incident that the DAO system pooled the investor’s money in a common enterprise. It means that
each investor’s fortunes tied to the fortunes of other investors by the pooling assets. 291 Therefore,
in DAO token case there is a horizontal commonality.
Some commentators do not agree with this conclusion.
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According to DAO’s

whitepaper, the token holders have the right to withhold their contributions if they do not want to
invest in the project.293 The author argues that if the token holders do not choose to participate,
the token holders will not share the profits and losses of the enterprise; therefore, there is not
horizontal commonality. 294 However, if the token holders did not make any movement for
accepting or declining, they will participate in the project. Therefore, I think that the DAO
system has already pooled the investors’ money in its enterprise.
DAO tokens can also satisfy the broad vertical commonality. 295 One court found that
vertical commonality can be found when the promoters provide advertisement, training, products,
and the areas where product are sold.296 In the DAO matter, the founders advertised the DAO
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tokens, explained how this system works, also the curators of DAO token approved the offers,
open the offer to vote. Therefore, the broad vertical commonality can be found in the DAO. 297
Since there is no relationship between the investors and the founders after founders
provided the code, it is hard to find narrow vertical commonality. 298 For the most court, a lack of
vertical commonality does not defeat common enterprise, since there is still a horizontal
commonality.299
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CHAPTER 4: SOLUTIONS FOR COMPANIES: HOW CAN COMPANIES ISSUE
TOKENS WITHOUT BREAKING U.S. SECURITIES LAWS?
Previously, we discussed whether tokens are securities. If tokens are securities, then the
issuers should register those tokens as securities with the SEC. Otherwise, the company and the
founders might face several severe consequences, such as debarment (a ban on working in the
securities market), 300 disgorgement, 301 or civil penalties, 302 or a combination of these three.
Therefore, if a person wants to raise funds in any offering that is possibly a security, the person
needs to register the offering with the SEC unless a statutory exemption applies or the person
obtains a “no-action” letter. Otherwise, the person must structure the offering so that it does not
fit under the 1933 Act’s definition of the term “security.” 303
In this chapter, I discuss the statutory exemptions available under the statutes enforced by
the SEC, the gloss added by SEC regulations, and judicial interpretations of statutory and
regulatory exemptions that might be available to token issuers. Then, after laying out
requirements for potential exemptions, I use the requirements and limitations to describe a path
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through which a token issuer might be able to avoid SEC registration without violating U.S.
securities laws.
4.1 Exemptions
There are several exemptions from the 1933 Act.304 The SEC is authorized to promulgate
the regulations to enable the 1933 Act. 305 There are many reasons Congress wanted to give these
exemptions. One of the most important reasons is that registration with the SEC is not an easy or
fast process. The entrepreneur needs to hire attorneys who specialize in securities law, and it can
take months to register tokens. Furthermore, the process is extremely expensive, often costing
more than one million dollars. 306 Therefore, Congress passed these exemptions in order to
protect capital formation.307 Exemptions provide lower costs for both the issuers and the buyers.
Four statutory and regulatory exemptions may be available to issuers or tokens: Section
4(a)(2), 308 Regulation D, 309 Regulation A, 310 and Regulation Crowdfunding (CF). 311 There are
some differences between these exemptions. Persons planning offerings of tokens need to
evaluate them before registering with the SEC. An issuer that seeks to rely on one or more of
these exemptions will have the burden of proving that their offering complies with the specific
304
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requirements or limitations put in place by Congress or the SEC on the exemption from
registration.312 Since the issuer has the burden of proof for the exemption(s), the issuer should
prepare a detailed evidentiary record to support its claim. 313
4.1.1 1933 Act Section 4(a)(2)
According to the 1933 Act, Section 4(a)(2), transactions not involving any public
offerings are exempt from SEC registration. 314 The 1933 Act states, “The provisions of section
77e of this title shall not apply to transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering.” 315
According to this provision, offerings limited to “qualified investors” need not be registered with
the SEC. Section 4(a)(2) exemption applies to both U.S. and non-U.S. private or public
companies.316
In order to understand what this exemption means, we need to focus on the term “public
offerings.” There is no definition of the term “public offering” in the 1933 Act or the 1934 Act.
Therefore, this thesis will analyze relevant case law and secondary sources, including SEC
rulings.
According to the case law, investors should be qualified for these investments. In SEC v.
Ralston Purina, Co., the court held that investors should be able to “fend for themselves”. 317 This
phrase means that investors should be knowledgeable in the transaction, experienced regarding
finance, and aware of the risks and merits. 318 Qualified institutional buyers, such as banks,
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savings and loan associations, accredited investors such as registered broker-dealers, and key
employees can fend for themselves in terms of this prong. 319
An issuer who qualifies for a Section 4(a)(2) exemption will most likely need to register
with the state securities office.320 Since each state has their own registration requirements, the
issuer should seek counsel to see whether the instrument needs to be registered.
If the issuer of the tokens sells the tokens to the public without any limitation, this
offering will not fall for an exemption under Section 4(a)(2). For example, if the issuer of DAO
tokens sold those tokens under this exemption, the buyers should know what kind of business
they are going to engage in and what kind of risks and merits they are going to get from the
business.
Generally, in order to avoid selling exempted securities to non-eligible investors, the
number of investors is limited.321 On the other hand, in token sales, the number of purchasers is
generally high.322 However, with a computer coding system, the issuer can limit the number of
buyers.
General solicitation and advertising of the instrument are prohibited for this exemption.323
If the issuer of tokens solicits or advertises the exempted securities on the internet, he or she
cannot get benefit from this exemption.
There are sale restrictions on these exempted securities. 324 Buyers of the restricted
securities should hold these securities for at least one year before they attempt to resell them.325
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It is one of the downsides for this exemption in terms of token sales. In general, the circulating
supply for the tokens is high. 326 This high circulating supply means that people who bought the
tokens want to sell them to other people and that other people desire to buy the tokens.
In conclusion, there are some obligations for getting benefit from the exemption under
the 1933 Act, Section 4(a)(2). According to one commentator, it is hard for the token sellers to
get benefit from this exemption since it is hard to control the buyers. 327 According to another
commentator, token issuers can provide more limited offerings to the smaller number of
investors get an exemption from the SEC. 328 This exemption can be achieved by the coding
systems. Also, the best thing with this exemption is that there is no dollar limitation like
Regulation A, Regulation Crowdfunding, and Regulation D.
4.1.2 Regulation D
The token issuers can apply for the Regulation D exemption.329 Regulation D has three
different exemptions in it. These exemptions are set out under Rules 504, 330 506(b), 331 and
506(c).332 The SEC promulgates these rules. 333
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For Rule 504, there is a five million dollar limitation for every year. 334 Offerings should
not exceed this amount in order to get benefit from this exemption. There is no limitation for the
investor qualifications in this rule. 335 However, there are resale restrictions on the exemption.336
Also, the offering most likely needs to be registered or qualified for the exemption under state
law.337
For Rule 506(b), there is no dollar limitation on the size of the offering. 338 If there are
“accredited purchasers,” 339 there is no limitation on the number of investors. 340 For the
accredited purchasers, the issuer shall reasonably believe that the investors are accredited. 341
Other than accredited purchasers, only 35 purchasers can buy these exempted securities. 342 The
issuers shall furnish specific information for the non-accredited investors. 343 There is a resale
restriction for this exemption. The offerings exempted under Rule 506(b) are potentially not to
be registered to the states.344
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For Rule 506(c), there is no limit to the size of the offering. 345 Only accredited investors
can buy these securities. Issuers of the token must reasonably believe that the investor is
accredited. Moreover, investors should take reasonable steps to verify all investors are
accredited.346 This exemption also has resale restrictions. Buyers should hold these securities for
six months if the issuer is the reporting company or one year if the issuer is a non-reporting
company. Since only accredited investors can buy this security, there is no need for furnishing
certain information. Also, under Rule 506(c) there is most likely no state registration
requirement.347
According to rule 504, 506(b), and 506(c) investors have resale restrictions. In the token
sales, people generally buy and sell quickly in a short time. Also, restrictions for the investors
(being “accredited investors” 348 or a limited number of non-accredited investors) prevent the
customers from buying certain utility tokens. 349 With this restriction, the intended buyers cannot
achieve certain services that rely on the tokens.
Reselling these exempted utilities could be a problem for the investors. Investors should
wait six months or one year.350 Even if these are the backsides, the SEC can oversee what is
going on with the token sales. In this way, the SEC can protect the investors.
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Filecoin can be the leading token for this exemption, specifically for Rule 506(c). On
August 25, 2017, the company filed form D, which is an exemption application form. 351 In the
application, the company chooses to get benefit from Rule 506(c). 352 Therefore, the company
promised to sell the tokens to the accredited investors and promised to verify the accredited
investors’ information. 353 The company did not have a dollar limitation for this fundraising.
Filecoin collected 257 million dollars from the token sale. 354 Regulation 506(c) can be one of the
best solutions for companies that want to sell their product to accredited investors without dollar
limitation.
4.1.3 Regulation A
Regulation A can be another solution for the ICO issuers. 355 The best part of Regulation
A is that there are no resale restrictions, unlike Regulation D and Regulation CF. 356 For
Regulation A, issuers can raise up to 20 million dollars for the first tier, 357 and 50 million dollars
for the second tier.358 For the first tier, there is no specific requirement for the investors; however,
for the second tier, there are some restrictions for unaccredited investors.
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For the first tier, the issuer still most likely needs to register or qualify for the exemption
in the state he or she wants to sell the securities.359 On the other hand, there is most likely no
state registration requirement for the second tier. 360 Even if the issuers do not have to register for
the second tier, they need to comply with state filing fees and antifraud provisions. 361 The issuer
should check whether he or she needs to register with the specific state before selling the
securities.
Some commentators consider Regulation A as a mini-IPO. 362 Therefore, the amount of
money companies spend on getting a Regulation A exemption could be very high. According to
one estimate, Regulation A offerings cost around $350,000. 363
On the other hand, some commentators believe that Regulation A is better than
Regulation D for token issuers.364 The specific resale restrictions for Regulation D make it harder
for the issuers and first-time investors to sell the tokens. Also, Regulation A is better than
Regulation D in terms of tokens’ fast trade volume.
The average ICOs’ size is around 25 million dollars in 2017. 365 Taking this into
consideration, many token issuers can get benefit from the Regulation A exemption. However, if
we compare the Regulation A exemption experience with one of the largest token sales, such as
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the DAO which raised $150 million, the maximum amount that can be raised would be not
enough.
4.1.4 Regulation Crowdfunding
Regulation Crowdfunding can be another solution for token issuers. 366 The issuers can
only raise up to $1,070,000 with this exemption during each year. 367 There are certain limitations
on the amount that the individuals can participate in crowdfunding. 368 If the individual investor’s
annual income or net worth is under the $100,000, that individual can participate only up to
$2,000 or 5% of annual income.369 If the investor’s annual income is higher than $100,000, the
investor can contribute 10% of its annual income. 370
Issuers shall use the registered funding portal or SEC-registered broker or dealers. 371
Also, there are several resale restrictions for crowdfunding. 372
If the issuers qualify under the crowdfunding exemption, the security that the issuer
offers will most likely be exempt from state registration. 373 It would lower the cost of the
registration process.
Some authors state that the crowdfunding exemption is not a good solution for initial coin
offerings. 374 One million dollars may not be enough for the average initial coin offerings. 375
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Second, there are resale restrictions for the buyers. Third, there is a specific intermediary
requirement for regulation crowdfunding. The author states that blockchain eliminates the need
for an intermediary since everything is recorded on the ledger. 376 I do not agree with this opinion
because a registered intermediary can also create a blockchain ledger to manage crowdfunding
processes.
On the other hand, there are several positive aspects of regulation crowdfunding. There is
no restriction in the regulation that states only accredited investors, or a limited number of
accredited investors, can participate.377 Also, these tokens will most likely be exempted from the
state registration requirement.378 Depending on the size of the initial coin offerings, issuers can
choose to get this exemption.
4.2 Decentralization of Managerial Efforts of Others
We discussed in the exemption part that if the token is a security what exemptions the
issuers could get. In this part, we will focus on how we can create a token without it being a
security in light of the SEC and the Courts’ decisions. The companies which issue the tokens can
structure their tokens in a little bit different way.
As I discussed in the DAO decision, the SEC mainly focused on whether curators used
the managerial efforts in the company. 379 The SEC found out that DAO’s curators used
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managerial authority on the business. 380 How can we create tokens without having managerial
efforts from the group or individuals? The answer comes with the new technology:
decentralization of the decision-making mechanism.
The DAO wanted to shift the managerial authority to the token owners, which almost hit
the right point. However, the white paper mentioned that the company wants to protect the
investors from the majority attacks and, therefore, they hired curators. 381 The power of curators
was very high.382 They had the power to choose which proposed agreement would be whitelisted
and offered to the DAO token holders. Also, they had the right to decide how many proposals
would be submitted to the system. 383
Let’s imagine the DAO fully decentralized the managerial efforts to all token holders. In
the first moment, when token holders make decisions, there would be no responsible person or
group for these managerial efforts. Therefore, there would be no responsible person to bear the
managerial efforts of others prong in the first phase. However, after the project is selected, there
will be one person or group who will be responsible for the rest of the managerial efforts. In this
scenario, DAO tokens cannot be considered as a security. However, after the people raise funds
to individual projects, there would be one person or group who would take responsibility for the
project. Then, that project could be an investment contract; therefore, it would be a security.
4.3 Completely Functional Utility Token Solution for the Pre-Functional Utility Tokens
As we discussed in the second chapter, the intended purpose of the utility tokens is that
they are designed to provide access for products or services. 384 In short, if the token issuers
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promise to provide this access after a while, the token can be considered as pre-functional. On
the other hand, if the issuer gives all the rights and services to the token holders at the time of
sale, there is a fully-functional utility token.
Though pre-functional utility token issuers promise that they are going to develop the
project, and one day the token holders will get the benefit, this promise cannot stop the SEC and
Courts from deciding that pre-functional utility tokens are not securities. 385 As we mentioned in
Munchee and Storj tokens, pre-functional utility tokens are likely to be considered a security. 386
The reason is that people have an expectation of profit from the managerial efforts of the token
developer. The token holders believe that the company or the group will develop the application.
Therefore, his or her investment becomes more valuable. 387 Especially under the Risk Capital
Test, the risk is higher for the investor who invests his or her money into the pre-functional
utility tokens.388
Therefore, companies should not try to launch an initial coin offering until they are
confident that the token has real functions in it. This suggestion is for companies that want to
launch real utility tokens, but did not make the token ready for use. If the company defrauds
investors, blue sky law will stop the issuers at a certain point. 389
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CONCLUSION
Securities law is a legal field that is important for both federal and state governments. In
1911, Kansas started to regulate securities in order to protect its agriculturists from the wealthy
industrialists. In 1933, the federal government adopted and expanded the application area of
securities law. Although the federal government has made many decisions and continues to have
primary control in securities law, states still have the power to enforce states’ securities
regulations within their borders.390
Both federal courts and federal administrative institutions, as well as state courts and state
administrative bodies, analyze ICOs with different tests. The federal government and the
majority of states implement the Howey Test to determine whether ICOs are securities. States
that do not use the Howey Test apply the Risk Capital Test to ICOs instead, and they act
according to the results. The primary purpose of the states is to record securities that are being
sold in their region and to prevent fraud. Recently, North Dakota made many decisions on ICOs
after the securities commission found out about illegal activities occurring within the state that
had caused significant harm to investors.391
Since this paper found that the majority of ICOs remain in the area of securities law,
entrepreneurs must comply with the rules of this field. Until now, crypto entrepreneurs wanted to
stay outside of securities law because the registration process is time-consuming and requires
them to spend a considerable amount of money. Therefore, I focused on the registration
exemptions and structure of the tokens to make the registration process easier and more
accessible to entrepreneurs.392
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After deciding if a token is a security, there are ways for the issuers to comply with
securities law. First, the issuer can register these tokens before selling them to the public. I did
not discuss this option in this paper since many entrepreneurs do not favor this solution. Second,
the issuer can apply for an exemption from registration. All exemptions have their own
advantages and disadvantages.
The 1933 Act Section 4(a)2 and Regulation D Rule 506 have no limitation regarding the
amount raised for companies. However, Regulation D Rule 504 has an upper limit of 5 million
dollars, and Regulation A Tier I, Regulation A Tier II, and Regulation CF have upper limits of
20 million, 50 million, and 1.07 million dollars, respectively. Regulation D Rule 504 and
Regulation A are the only exemptions with no resale restrictions. Other exemptions have six
month or one-year exemptions, depending on the status of the issuers. If the issuer is the
reporting company, then the restrictions are just for six months; otherwise, the resale restrictions
are for one year. Regulation CF, Regulation A Tier I, and Regulation D Rule 506 generally do
not need to be registered with the state securities office. However, 1933 Act Section 4(a)(2),
Regulation D Rule 504, and Regulation A Tier II will most likely need to be registered with the
state securities office. Token issuers should assess the benefits of the exemptions and apply for
them with the SEC accordingly. In so doing, the obligations of the state for the registration or
notification should also be reviewed, and these obligations must be fulfilled. 393
Although it may be difficult to realize, issuers may be relieved of these obligations by
going beyond the application of securities law. One of the solutions for remaining outside of
securities law would be the decentralization of the decision-making mechanism to the investors.
In this way, the investors will have control over the company. Therefore, the managerial efforts
of others prong will shift to the investors. However, it is better for the investors to keep in mind
393
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that, even if the DAO were to try this prong, the company would fail since there were curators
who had the power to publish the offers according to their judgment.

394

Issuers may market their fully-functional tokens rather than unfinished projects. Many
utility tokens were launched to develop new projects. For example, it is possible for the Storj
token to be an investment contract under the Risk Capital Test, even if it does not offer a profit.
The reason behind this is that issuers made the investors risk their money on unfinished projects.
Therefore, if the issuer produces fully-functional utility tokens, there will be no investment
contracts that investors will have to put at risk.395
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